Former Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer Visits Lexington
Discussing his book, Reading the Constitution: Why I Choose Pragmatism Not Textualism, Breyer Sounds the Alarm on the dangers of Constitutional Textualism at the Supreme Court.
“Breyer offers a cogent explanation of judicial reasoning, focusing particularly on the difference between textualism—now dominating the current Court—and pragmatism, which is his guiding principle. . . . A deeply informed analysis of judicial history.”
Kirkus Reviews
B Y L A U R I E A T W A T E R
On an evening in May, now retired Supreme Court justice Stephen Breyer wasn’t at Cary Hall in Lexington to weigh in on the politics of the day or fret about the end of our constitutional order. He was onstage for a “fireside chat” with the Cary Lecture Series’ Rita Goldberg.
The Cary event was promoted as a conversation about Breyer’s new book, a volume that examines the opposing practices of textualism and pragmatism in reading and interpreting the Constitution: Reading the Constitution: Why I Choose Pragmatism Not Textualism.
The book is timely, and the size of the Lexington audience reflected immense public interest. So much change and disruption is being directed at the American people right now, and we are desperately looking to our leaders to help us make sense of what is happening.
As Lexingtonians, we are fortunate to have the Cary Lecture Series bring us such distinguished speakers.
With his dry wit and soft laughter, Breyer is disarming and down-to-earth. Delighting in French references (he is a noted Francophile) and using stories involving French teachers, trains, and snails, he talked about the business of deciding the most critical issues in the country—decisions that will impact the lives of over 300 million individuals with a calm demeanor that was notable given the historical moment. He is not given to hyperbolic statements. He is an institutionalist, a pragmatist, and an intellectual.
Throughout the evening, he dispensed the wisdom of his many years in public life and academia, which is rich, varied, and long, having reached the age of 86.
He [Justice Breyer] served as a law clerk to Justice Arthur Goldberg of the Supreme Court of the United States during the 1964 term, as a special assistant to the assistant US Attorney General for antitrust (1965–1967), as an assistant special prosecutor of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force (1973), as special counsel of the US Senate Judiciary Committee (1974–1975), and as chief counsel of that committee (1979–1980). He was an assistant professor, professor of law, and lecturer at Harvard Law School (1967–1994), a professor at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government (1977–1980), and a visiting professor at the College of Law, Sydney, Australia, and at the University of Rome. From 1980 to 1990, he served as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and as its chief judge from 1990 to 1994. He also served as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States (1990–1994) and of the United States Sentencing Commission (1985–1989). President Clinton nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat August 3, 1994.
Breyer’s background is steeped in institutions—from Harvard to Congress to the Supreme Court. Like most people who live and work in hierarchical environments, Breyer favors a calm and deliberate approach to seeing and understanding the world. Despite their philosophical disagreements, Breyer says his experience on the court was overwhelmingly collegial and cooperative, and not competitive or contentious. “I have never in a conference room heard a voice raised in anger. I have never heard one judge say something rude, not even as a joke, about another judge.”
He has never worked in the disruptive ethos of the private sector (especially the transcendent tech sector, a world that ridicules norms with its ‘move fast and break things’ mentality). The closest experience he might draw on is his time as a Congressional staffer. Amidst all the chaos around us, and the obvious agitation of the audience at times, Breyer is a calm presence.
Breyer says that he wrote this book to address this disruptive moment in history, which has been significantly defined by major decisions handed down by the Supreme Court’s supermajority in 2022, culminating in the overturning of Roe v. Wade. It was after this session that Breyer resigned from the Supreme Court and was replaced by Ketanji Brown Jackson. Breyer’s latest book critiques the judicial philosophy underlying these decisions.
During his talk, Breyer stays in his lane, refusing to intermingle politics with the law. The courts are being tested daily, and defiance is a constant threat. The institutions that provide societal stability and rules, as well as guardrails for understanding our world, are being challenged, dismantled, and altered. Because of this, there is a renewed focus on the courts nationwide, and Breyer offers this book as part of a citizen’s toolkit for understanding what is happening on this iteration of the court and its departure from the norms of the 20th century.
Whether you love it or hate it, the shift has caused seismic disorientation. In the face of this, Breyer exudes calm, and admittedly, Breyer’s lack of urgency can feel disconcerting. Upon examining most of his public appearances, however, it’s evident that he’s not naturally inclined to engage on an emotional level; he remains remarkably consistent. He maintains a public reverence for the secrecy of court deliberations and the privacy of his fellow Justices.
This book and its title are Breyer’s way of bringing our attention to what he sees as the current danger to the court, to America, and the Constitution: the competing schools of “textualism” and “pragmatism.” You might call this book his very narrow opinion on what ails the courts at this moment.
For us non-lawyers, watching the conversation at Cary Hall could be a little frustrating. There were no “hair on fire” moments from Breyer. But it was an invitation to reflect, to learn more about judicial philosophy and how it guides decision-making on the Court, and to dig a little deeper for context and meaning. This article aims to do a little of that, but it serves mainly as an invitation to investigate further and develop your own analysis and understanding.
A Traditional Pragmatist
Breyer counts himself among traditionalist pragmatist judges who focus on “purposes, values, and consequences.” This judicial philosophy was emblematic of courts during most of the 20th Century, and gave judges the freedom to use a varied number of approaches to analysis while hewing to the fundamental and widely accepted intent of the framers: liberty, equality, democracy, and respect for individual dignity.
Pragmatism is a system that focuses heavily on current society and impartial outcomes for citizens. According to Bryer’s book, “It considers ‘text, history, precedent, tradition, purposes, values, and consequences.’”
It also values and considers the process of lawmaking as a key to the intention behind any given law or statute. As a former congressional staffer, Breyer understands the sausage-making that goes into creating laws, and he finds it important. For Breyer, understanding and considering “purpose” ensures that the Constitution and laws keep pace with an evolving society, thereby assuring that the underlying values of the Constitution remain vibrant and relevant. Without these pragmatic considerations, he writes:
Purely originalist interpretations of the Constitution may create a less workable Constitution, diminishing its ability to hold together over time a nation of now 332 million people seeking to put into practice the Constitution’s democratic, humane values.
This brings us to the questions of originalism and textualism. What are they, exactly?
Why I Chose Pragmatism Not Textualism
“The words in the text are the first thing you look at. If a word is carrot, that does not mean fish,” Breyer said to the crowd at Cary Hall. “But very often you don’t know, really. It’s somewhat ambiguous. It could mean any of several things…and people wrote the words in Congress, and they had something in mind. So, let’s find out…”
In Chapter One of his book, Breyer outlines the philosophy of “purpose-based approaches” or pragmatism that he embraces, in which the operative question is “why?”:
To further understand all implications of a case, Breyer explains that pragmatists study the broader implications of the disputed lower court decision—the downstream effects (consequences), adherence to stare decisis (consideration of prior court decisions—precedent), and the law’s stability—it’s ability to stand and meet its purpose.
In this evaluation, the purpose-driven judges will often consult or imagine a “reasonable legislator” to hypothesize the result intended by the legislation—the statutory purpose.
This respect for, and understanding of, the legislative process is part of the Breyer ethos and a key part of interpretive practice for much of the twentieth century. Legislative history was once a valued tool in the Supreme Court’s toolbox. The pragmatist believes that through the passage of time, legislation is an attempt to address evolving problems in society. Think about gun laws—Lexington’s militia carried muskets onto the Green. Could they imagine an M16?
As consumers of news and stories in a modern media climate, most readers and viewers understand the importance of context. When interpreting centuries old documents like the Constitution or even laws on the books from recent decades, Breyer makes the case for taking a prismatic view of both the language and intent of any given statute or decision—including linguistics, history, intent, values and practice, to craft a judgement that “works better or that will help society function ‘better.’” This interpretive philosophy and approach is sometimes called the “living” Constitution.
So, What’s a Textualist?
“About 20 or 30 years ago,” Breyer said at Cary Hall, “they invented this thing, ‘textualism.’ Nino Scalia wrote a book about it. Nino (Scalia) and I were good friends. We didn’t agree about a lot of things. He [Nino] said, ‘Look at the text.’ He was afraid [that] if you looked at these other things, the judge would substitute what he thought was ‘good’ for what was the ‘law.’”
“Textualism and originalism,” Breyer writes in Chapter Two of his book, “…are relatively easy to define. They ask the judge to look, almost exclusively, to language. And their main point is that statutory (or constitutional) words mean what a reasonable person would have taken them to mean at the time they were written.”
Textualism emerged as a response to the social turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s. Antonin Scalia at the University of Chicago, and Robert Bork at Yale were promoting originalism when interpreting the Constitution, and textualism for interpreting statutes. What was the “original intent” of the framers or the original public meaning” of a statute’s language when it was drafted. Originalism rejected the view that statutory interpretation should seek to understand “legislative intent”—what was the problem that legislators were trying to solve? Textualism looks at language, rejects purpose-based arguments and relies on narrow interpretation. It often overlaps with “originalism.” This ran counter to the philosophy of the Warren Court which embraced the “living Constitution.” Textualism is ascendant in the courts today and is taking the courts in a new direction.
Breyer views the growing popularity of textualism as a potentially dangerous approach to interpreting statutes and reading the Constitution, and he expressly acknowledges this as his purpose for writing the book:
Why am I writing this book? The reason lies in the growth and popularity among many judges, lawyers, and others in the legal community of an approach to interpretation that is, or may become, very different. When interpreting a text, every judge will read that text and will recognize that, at the least, its words limit the scope of a proper interpretation. The word “fish” in a statute does not mean “fowl.” But some judges adopt a form of interpretation, sometimes called “textualism” which in many difficult cases places more interpretive weight upon the text (or in some circumstances, other linguistic considerations that supplement the text), than I believe, and others have long believed, is appropriate…I fear the current enthusiasm for widespread adoption of more purely textural or linguistic forms of interpretation means that other equally, or more important tools will be set aside.I fear that the current enthusiasm for adopting purely textual or linguistic interpretations means that other equally, or even more, important tools will be overlooked.
We as citizens may ask: Why in the world would we want to rely on only antiquated language or understandings to interpret something that will have huge consequences in modern life? After all, life today is far different from what it was in the 18th or 19th centuries, when some amendments were adopted.
Scalia cited “four promises” that he felt made this approach superior to pragmatism, and Justice Breyer described them to the audience at Cary Hall:
Promise One: “It’s easier to use it.”
Promise Two: “You’ll get approximately the same thing all over the country.”
Promise Three: “Congress will like it because they’ll know what’s going to happen to the words they’re writing.”
Promise Four: “It will prevent judges from substituting what they think is ‘good’ for the law.”
Breyer says that advocates for textualism, like Scalia, believe it is “the method that provides the one best answer to every interpretative question and consequently prevents judges from substituting their views of ‘what is good’ for the law,” ensuring that interpretive rules are stable, predictable, consistent, objective, and neutral.
This departs sharply from the pragmatist’s consideration of purpose, values, and consequences, and Justice Breyer writes that he finds this inflexible reliance upon original history and language…harmful for both reading statutes and the Constitution.
Onstage at Cary, Breyer engaged in an imaginary (and amusing) debate with a textualist. Discussing the recent decision overturning Roe v. Wade, Breyer invoked his imaginary interlocutor:
Mr. Textualist, now you overturned Roe v. Wade. Why did you overturn Roe Vs. Wade?
I know what it is. You said it is ‘very, very wrong.’ ‘Egregiously wrong’ were the words in the opinion.
‘Oh,’ I say, ‘now I understand’ … you felt you could overrule that because you thought it was egregiously, very, very wrong.
But you think that I might substitute what I think is bad or good for the law.
But when you decide something is wrong rather than right, you wouldn’t substitute something you think is wrong or right for the law.
You think it’s really wrong. I don’t think it was so wrong…
So, the Fourth Promise of Mr. Textualist is violated in this scenario. Judges are applying corrections to original decisions they felt were ‘wrong.’ In this example, textualism does not appear to “deter judges from substituting their views of what is ‘good’ for the law,” Breyer implies. He sees this type of “textualist” decision-making reading and disregard for previous decisions as damaging to the courts and society. “And at its worst, it [textualism] will make the Constitution a document that is too rigid, that will not pass the test of time, and that will not serve its basic value-laden objectives.”
In fact, Breyer decries departures from stare decisis (to stand by things decided in Latin) as destabilizing, except in rare cases. “The fact that judges think an earlier case was incorrectly decided cannot be, and never has been, a strong basis, by itself anyway, for overruling an earlier case,” he writes.
Over time, public opinion is important if the “informed public” is to accept the “rule of law.” How is the public supposed to react when, for example, laws that were enacted not using this protocol (like Roe v. Wade) are overturned because the underpinnings are not consistent with textualism? There are many such laws. Will we overturn them all?
In the end (and after reading his book), Breyer holds out hope that current textualists will realize the limits of this restrictive methodology and return to more pragmatic practices, as more and more decisions cut against the will of the people. He acknowledges that this will take time. His advocacy for a more flexible approach is his contribution to the discussion. He hopes that the Supreme Court will continue to serve the needs of an evolving society while upholding the foundational principles of our democracy. He worries that relying solely on originalism and textualism will erode public confidence, as the public comes to see the courts as out of sync with society and the wishes of its citizens.
Repeatedly during his Cary “chat,” Breyer resisted calling current events, decisions, and general disregard for court decisions a Constitutional emergency. He maintained calm confidence in the system, as his experience has taught him. He is a company man. He is a man of institutions. In his reading of history, the courts have shifted before (read his chapter on Paradigm Shifts), and the Constitution stands.
“We’re not there there yet, we are not there yet,” he said reassuringly in response to Tufts student Kunal’s question during the Q&A. “We still have this Constitution. We still have the courts…And we still have freedom of speech and freedom of the press,” he said, citing the First Amendment.
This statement hung heavily in the air as he answered Kunal’s question, which pointedly referenced the detention of Rümeysa Öztürk, a Tufts University doctoral graduate student, who was snatched off the street by masked men for expressing her opinions in an op-ed she co-authored for the college newspaper.
Kunal asked, “To what extent do you believe that the detainment of students across the country and this particular student is a signaling of loss of rights in this country?”
To answer, Breyer invoked Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment by Bert Neuborne, a book he admires that celebrates the First Amendment.
Breyer explained to Kunal and the audience that in our country, we are free to think and say whatever we want. And to assemble with others to discuss ideas, engage in persuasion, and amplify our thoughts through the press.
“This is a way of making a democracy,” he said, which by implication he regards as an active and ongoing pursuit. “The people are actually pretty much in charge of making the democracy work.” In this reading, we see that Breyer views the work of the Constitution as an ongoing and active process.
So, he says, this is our recourse as citizens: to speak freely and sway public opinion to influence judicial interpretation. To actively participate in the democratic process. To hold the courts responsible.
Back in Cary Hall, Breyer’s reasoned response to Kunal’s concerns, while sensible, felt inadequate in this moment of frightening overreach. Without the urgency, the message sometimes gets lost. But it’s a very important message. We must remember the promise of our amazing Constitution: The government derives its power from the consent of the people.
What’s a (concerned) Citizen to Do?
As always, it’s best to start a fight armed with the facts. In his book, Breyer uses actual cases to illustrate at a great level of detail why he believes his judicial approach is superior to textualism. In the best traditions of persuasion, he has laid out his case. Breyer has given us the opportunity to understand more. He feels that the movement towards textualism and a constitution frozen in time is inadequate and ill-advised in a modern society.
While doing so, he also defends the apolitical, impartial ethos of the court. He insists that politics enters only once in the tenure of each justice—the beginning—when there is a vacancy to fill on the Supreme Court and the party in power selects its candidate. But he insists that that’s where politics ends. It is the ‘water’s edge’ for the Supreme Court. But, even a casual observer understands that most frequently, a Justice’s opinion will align with the President who appointed them. There are exceptions, and Breyer can cite them to support his point. However, it’s the transcendent judicial philosophy of “originalism and textualism” adopted by the right side of the partisan divide that troubles him, not the political motivations that seem to be seeping in.
Breyer said it’s ultimately up to citizens to make corrections when they sense things are running amok, through their vote and the legislative process. But in the modern era, many Americans have come to depend on the Supreme Court as the institution that puts things “right,” and they are confused by the courts, especially the Supreme Court, right now.
Though Breyer refuses to assign political motives to this evolution, it is instructive to understand the politics behind the current shift in the court and the organizations that are behind it.
What Has Led to the Rise of Textualism?
Trust in the courts has perhaps served as a convenient illusion for those on the left who became “comfortably numb” while things were going their way.
While liberals and progressives have enjoyed the fruits of the Warren Court and were comfortable with its overall direction—advancing civil rights, labor rights, expanding the voting franchise, paving the way toward enshrining the bodily autonomy of women by protecting privacy rights, and more—the right wing was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the court’s direction.
Over the last 30 years or so, the political right has been stewing in a pot of discontent and disappointment with the courts. This led to the rise of numerous conservative legal organizations, beginning in the Reagan era, and focused primarily on college campuses. These organizations were created as a response to what they perceived as overly liberal interpretations of the law and the Constitution, and as a means for conservatives to develop legal arguments that would counter the prevailing trend of the “living constitution” and what they saw as “judicial activism.”
The Federalist Society
In the ensuing years, the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies has become a juggernaut for the political right, particularly in fundraising and recruitment.
Students at Yale and the University of Chicago founded The Federalist Society. In its Mission Statement, it says:
We are committed to the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be.
Legal figures such as Antonin Scalia and Leonard Leo emerged from the Federalist Society. Scalia provided the legal rationale through his embrace and promotion of originalism (in the interpretation of historical texts, such as the Constitution) and textualism (for the interpretation of statutes). Leo provided the political lubricant that promoted the people, and thereby this philosophy, throughout the ecosystem of conservative and libertarian legal elites, law schools, students, professors, and other clubs and organizations for legal professionals. Later, Leo established networks that directly led to the White House and the Supreme Court.
Festering discontent served as a significant vehicle for advancing the conservative movement, which harnessed the rising power of the Federalist Society to serve its goals in the courts. Leo created a funnel for judicial talent, recruited candidates for judicial appointments and elections around the country, and funded campaigns both on the ground and in the media. His reach included building relationships with powerful conservative groups like the National Rifle Association, anti-abortion groups, and religious organizations. According to an investigation by ProPublica, his fundraising skills helped fuel this work:
Early Federalist Society members Antonin Scalia and Leonard Leo would rise to the top, with Leo practicing the behind-the-scenes arts that propelled Scalia to the Supreme Court.
Leonard Leo
Leo’s position was unlike any other, with far more influence and power. Many legal stars on the right owe their professional success to Leonard Leo, according to the ProPublica exposé. Now he is known as President Trump’s “judge whisperer,” having provided the President with lists of potential Supreme Court candidates. Leo is a bona fide power broker.
In 2019, the Bangor Daily News (BDN), a local Maine paper that usually serves sleepy Northeast Harbor, Maine, began reporting on Leo and his machine. Leo became a full-time resident of Northeast Harbor in 2018, having visited the area throughout his life. Leo held a fundraiser for Senator Susan Collins at his 8,000-square-foot Tudor mansion in 2019. They were met by protesters. Previously, living a relatively quiet life in this little hamlet, Leo was outed, and life hasn’t been so quiet for him in Maine since that day.
Leo has been forced to increase his security according to the BDN, and also increased his charitable giving in the town. Many see this as an attempt to buy off the locals. Increasingly, his non-profit group, The Concord Fund, has invested in conservative Maine causes per the BDN.
Pro Publica reported on a massive 2022 event where Leo entertained the right’s political and legal elites. This reporting gives us a look at, among other things, what you might call the “lifestyle perks” of being a member of the Federalist Society. Fancy food, a boat filled with champagne, and a weeklong all-expense-paid “conference” sponsored by George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School. All reported in detail by ProPublica.
Leonard Leo has long understood the value of these types of perks, as has Harlan Crow, one of his super donors. This is one of the functions that the Federalist Society provides: to offer lifestyle enhancements that keep young conservative legal intellectuals and professionals engaged in lower-paying public service jobs, rather than pursuing high-paying positions in the private sector. As this has become exposed, there is increased interest in investigating the benefits received by individuals like Clarence Thomas and his wife, Ginny, who appear to have benefited from Mr. Crow in many ways, from trips to tuition.
The big party hosted by Mr. Leo was a celebration of the landmark decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in June 2022, decisions that began to erase years of pragmatic judicial philosophy culminating with the overturning of Roe.
Rules and Norms
Now in the crosshairs are all privacy rights, marriage rights, environmental laws for combating climate change, gun laws, autonomy of federal agencies, and more.
These major decisions—and the next wave to come—have enormous consequences for every American. That conservatives (now MAGA)—want to go back and undo the many perceived ‘wrongs’ of the courts as they see them (see the Roe v Wade decision comment “egregiously wrong”) was to be anticipated. He has created the Teneo Network, which he described to NPR’s Steve Inskeep as another “talent pipeline” much like the one used to secure legal talent for the courts.
What was not anticipated from the courts was the blatant disregard for “rules and norms” of the courts, which have been respected heretofore. This includes stare decisis (the principle that a court should follow the decisions of prior cases when deciding similar cases), truth in their representations to Congress during appointment hearings, and adherence to ethics and transparency in recusals and generally.
These institutional underpinnings are features of the court that Justice Breyer believes in to his bones. And while the current supermajority is handing down many decisions that are wildly unpopular with the majority of the country (even as they thrill a minority and a group of very powerful elites), where is a principled opposition? Judges, legislators, and public officials are muted or silent. Suffering from a form of normalcy bias, they seem to feel that everything will automatically correct itself. But the public is losing confidence. People are beginning to doubt the blind faith they once placed in the courts, justice, and the rule of law. Public opinion of the courts is at an all-time low.
As the motives of the conservative recruiting class are revealed and the incentives they use to maintain loyalty appear to be part of a long-running political plan, the courts appear to be just another political organization, and the public is catching on.
Politics and Pragmatism
Engaging in the philosophical debate between originalism, textualism, and pragmatism is to engage in politics. The Supreme Court is at the apex of a system that is fundamentally political. Both sides must engage, and the Federalist Society has a huge head start. The speed and velocity of the change since MAGA have been staggering, thanks to Project 2025, and have not been met by an equal counterforce.
In his book, Former Justice Breyer identifies the problems of originalism and textualism, but his solution —a time-consuming wait-and-see proposition and faith in the apolitical nature of the Supreme Court —frankly terrifies many who are calling for a more urgent and political response.
“Waldman’s book devastatingly demonstrates that . . . the current Court has made clear that even the judiciary’s legitimacy as the law’s highest expositor cannot be presumed.”
– Laurence Tribe, The New York Review of Books
Michael Waldman of the Brennan Center for Justice has written fervently on this topic (The Supermajority: How the Supreme Court Divided America) and spoken around the country. He often notes that it took only three days for the court to strike down a decade’s worth of social legislation aimed at improving the lives and increasing equality for millions of Americans.
With his success in the courts manifest, Leonard Leo looks to expand his reach into other vital areas of American society, shaping the future using the same methods funded by extremely wealthy individuals and shrouded in secrecy.
We are at a turning point, as Justice Breyer rightfully noted. For Lexingtonians, having just experienced Lex 250—a rousing refresher on the origins of democracy and the resistance to monarchy in our very own town—it’s time to stay engaged! Learn more about what is happening and why. Participate in this democracy. Pick a side and jump in. Vote! Read Justice Stephen Breyer’s book, but don’t stop there.
SOURCES FOR FURTHER READING AND CONTEMPLATION
Reading the Constitution by Stephen Breyer
https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Reading-the-Constitution/Stephen-Breyer/9781668021545
Making Our Democracy Work by Stephen Breyer
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/18123/making-our-democracy-work-by-stephen-breyer/
The Supermajority by Michael Waldman
https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Supermajority/Michael-Waldman/9781668006078
Reading the Law by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner
Madison’s Music-Reading the First Amendment by Burt Neuborne
https://www.amazon.com/Madisons-Music-Reading-First-Amendment/dp/1620970414
We Don’t Talk About Leonard Leo by Andy Kroll, Andrea Bernstein and Ilya Marritz, illustrations by Nate Sweitzer for ProPublica
https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-
Leonard Leo is making bigger plays in Maine politics by Billy Kobin
Leonard Leo, Harlan Crow could be subpoenaed over Supreme Court justices’ travel by Billy Kobin
Conservative Activist Poured Millions Into Groups Seeking to Influence Supreme Court on Elections and Discrimination by Andy Kroll, ProPublica, and Andrew Perez and Aditi Ramaswami, The Lever
https://www.propublica.org/article/leonard-leo-scotus-elections-nonprofits-discrimination
The man who helped roll back abortion rights now wants to ‘crush liberal dominance’ by Steve Inskeep and Obed Manuel
https://www.npr.org/2024/11/24/nx-s1-5199049/federalist-society-conservative-supreme-court
The Incompatibility of Textualist and Originalist Approaches to Legislative History – The Harvard Law Review
ABOUT THE CARY LECTURE SERIES
The Cary Lecture Series began as part of a bequest to the town of Lexington by two sisters, Susanna E. Cary and Eliza Cary Farnham. Their gift included the Cary Memorial Building, a scholarship fund for graduating seniors, and four free public lectures a year. The sisters were part of a prominent Lexington family that also donated the public library and Hastings Park, although they themselves never lived in town. They spent summers and holidays here at the home of their uncle, William H. Cary, but they grew up in Jamaica Plain and spent their adult lives in New York City. They named the bequest after their father, Isaac Harris Cary, a businessman and philanthropist.
The Cary Lecture Committee:
Kevin Oye, Chair
Monica Galizzi
Rita Goldberg
Omar Khudari
Meryl Loonin
